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THE NEw PHILOSOPHY OF THE PUBLIC DEBT. By Harold G. Moulton.
Washington: Brookings Institution, 1943. Pp., 93. $1.00.
IN this little book Dr. Moulton again shows his talent for direct, simple
exposition. At the outset, he tells the reader frankly that the book is an attack
on the economic ideas of Professor Alvin Hansen-and thus indirectly of
Keynes. He then proceeds immediately to tackle the main points in dispute.
His bluntness and economy of style make the book easy and enjoyable to
read.
Unfortunately, Dr. Moulton's economic analysis is not up to his prose
style. On certain vital points he misconstrues Professor Hansen's argument;
on others, his own reasoning is faulty. These shortcomings appear early in
the book in his discussion of investment opportunity. It has commonly been
assumed, by economists as well as laymen, that investment can pretty much
be taken for granted; that an adequate rate of investment is, in fact, a natural
feature of a "free" economy. Professor Hansen has done an important ser-
vice in emphasizing the fact that this is not true. He has shown very clearly
that the process of production and consumption by itself requires no more
than the replacement of existing capital. Opportunity for new investment
arises only if there is change and growth in the economic system. It follows
that the future rate of investment depends on the rate at which our economy
can be expected to change and expand.
There is, of course, ample ground here for legitimate differences of opinion.
Some writers think that technological change will use so much more capital
in the future as to make up for a reduced rate of population growth and ter-
ritorial expansion. Others pin their hopes on the absorption of large (annual)
amounts of capital in countries like China and Brazil. Professor Hansen. and
many others with him, are inclined to doubt that these outlets will be sufficient
to absorb the large amount of saving we tend to do at reasonably high levels
of income. But he would be the first to admit that conclusive proof, one way
or the other, is impossible.
Dr. Moulton does not base his criticism, however, on the development of
economically backward areas or on the future rate and character of techno-
logical change. He denies, in effect, that change and growth are essential to
investment. "It is an obvious truth that the needs and desires of an expand-
ing populati6n constitute potential markets for the sale of goods and services.
But it is equally true that the unfilled wants and desires of the existing popu-
lation constitute potential markets." I The problem of investment is here con-
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THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
fused with the general problem of production. It is quite true that we need
not lack markets for the output of our labor and other resources so long as a
large number of people have unfilled wants and desires. But it does not at all
follow that the additional production will provide an opportunity for the profit-
able investment of all the saving the community would like to do. What the
sharecroppers, store clerks, coal miners, and others need is income not capital.
They are scarcely in a position to borrow and pay interest or dividends on the
surplus funds for which insurance companies, trust funds, and other would-be
investors are seeking an outlet. Their wants can be satisfied only through the
transfer of income with no strings attached. And this, as a practical matter,
can be accomplished only through government borrowing or taxation. But
these are the very policies Dr. Moulton is attacking.
Failure to distinguish between the problem of investment and that of pro-
duction in general explains Dr. Moulton's remarkable conclusion that Pro-
fessor Hansen has recently abandoned his whole position. "In concluding
this discussion, it should be noted that the idea that we have reached a stage
of arrested development has apparently now been abandoned by its leading
advocate. In 1942 Mr. Hansen is quoted as saying: 'There is no evidence
that our economy is in any sense becoming decadent, inefficient, incapable of
continued progress in productivity' ... " 2 Professor Hansen has, of course,
never said that our economy is becoming inefficient or incapable of progress
in productivity. On the contrary, he has often pointed out that productivity
increased at a rapid rate in the thirties, in spite of low income and unemploy-
ment, and that this progress is likely to continue in the future. Professor
Hansen is concerned not about technical efficiency, the ability of engineers
and production managers to turn out goods whenever there is a demand for
them, but rather with the over-all ability of our economy to generate sufficient
demand to keep the factors of production fully employed. This is, of course,
quite a different thing.
The rest of the book is devoted to a discussion of the dangers of an expand-
ing public debt. Again, the argument is somewhat clouded by misunder-
standing of Professor Hansen's position. In introducing the "New Philosophy",
Dr. Moulton says: "The new philosophy holds . . . that a rising debt has
no adverse consequences . . . . ,,3 This is far from accurate. Professor IIan-
sen realizes as clearly as any one else that a large debt involves difficult prob-
lems. Most important of these is the so-called transfer problem. As a com-
munity we pay the interest on the debt to ourselves. Also, the existence of a
debt in no way impairs our physical capacity to produce. Thus, in terms of
potential output and enjoyment of goods and services, we are no worse off with
a debt than without one. But we are likely to feel worse off. Payment of





to feel comforted when they pay taxes by the reflection that, as a community,
they are getting the money back again in the form of interest. They will take
the interest for granted and resent paying the taxes. Psychologically and
politically, a large debt is very definitely a problem.
This is Dr. Moulton's first big argument against the "New Philosophy".
So far as Professor Hansen is concerned, it misses the mark completely. The
only difference between him and Dr. Moulton on this point is that he relates
the expansion of debt to the expansion of national income and also that he
faces frankly the fact that in a period of inadequate private investment the
alternative to an increasing public debt is depression and unemployment (or
a drastic redirection of income from savers to consumers).
Dr. Moulton's other main argument against debt expansion is that it is
bound to cause inflation. He relies heavily for support on the completely false
analogy of our present war economy. The difference is, of course, elementary.
In modem war, military demands are limited only by the extent to which it
is thought possible, or expedient, to squeeze the civilian sector of the economy.
Inevitably, a great excess of purchasing power over the available supply of
civilian goods is distributed. This creates strong inflationary pressure which
must be kept in check through rationing, price controls, savings bond cam-
paigns, taxation, and the like. In peacetime, on the other hand, the purpose
of deficit financing is to make good a deficiency in the private demand for
goods and services. Instead of putting pressure on available productive capac-
ity, government spending in peace merely contributes toward raising activity
to a normal level. Moreover, as income and production rise, there is a strong
tendency toward reduction of the deficit; tax receipts automatically increase
and relief needs decrease, while both business and political leaders think now
that prosperity is returning government aid in maintaining income is no longer
necessary. There is far more danger in the modem world, with its strong bias
toward depression, that peacetime deficits will be too small rather than too
large.
One comes away from this book with a feeling of disappointment that Dr.
Moulton's gifts for exposition have not been used to clarify for a wide audience
the difficult and extremely important issues of economic policy with which we
will be confronted in the future. As it is, the book, marred by serious errors
of analysis and interpretation, is more likely to confuse than to enlighten its
readers.
ALxN R. SwEEzy f
t Associate Professor of Economics, Williams College.
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THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR AND THE LAW. By Julien Cornell. New
York: The John Day Co., 1943. Pp. x, 158. $1.75.
"THE story of man's struggle for freedom of religious and intellectual belief
is the story of civilization, for only as he becomes free does man enter into
that state superior to mere animal existence which may be truly called civi-
lized." I So Julien Cornell starts his book on the conscientious objector and the
law. The facts throw an interesting sidelight on our institutions. Our democ-
racy is tested by our treatment "of a minority who place moral duties above
duty to the State." 2 While we are doing better in this war than in World
War I, yet the picture of our handling of conscientious objectors is not one of
which we can be proud. We are far behind the British in our treatment of
those who say, "In spite of your power, I won't !"
There are times when compulsion of the individual may seem necessary, but
that is merely because of our natural desire, particularly in time of war, to
make men march in step and our failure to realize the valuable lesson that
comes from the individual who stands alone, adamant and unafraid. In Eng-
land, with a far smaller population, some 45,000 men were granted exemp-
tion from military service as compared with 6,000 in the United States, and
probably an equal number who have been put into non-combatant military
service.
When one finishes reading Cornell's book, he feels that the problems dis-
cussed are a maze of confusion, and that is so. I was reminded of the first
time I went into court in one of these cases. My client, a conscientious ob-
jector-and a tough one-had been indicted for refusal to fill out a question-
naire. I sought a writ of habeas corpus, basing my argument on the fact that
my client should not be compelled against his conscience to do anything to
promote the war effort. The test of his conscience seemed to me to require
a judicial, not an administrative, determination. I was much ruffled when the
court refused to hear argument on the theory that a man must be inducted
before the question can be raised. Induction meant submission to military con-
trol. If my client then refused to obey a military command, the Articles of
War provided that he might "suffer death or such other punishment as a court
martial may direct." 3 And induction raised other difficulties. My client natur-
ally had conscientious objections against the induction itself.
In spite of my expostulations and my insistence that he was a masochist, he
would have "none of it." He would not compromise. He was, therefore, sen-
tenced to jail for a term of one year, and while imprisoned, his questionnaire
was filled out by his jailor. When released, my client was called for physical
examination. He refused to respond. As a result, he was sentenced to three
additional years in jail. Somehow it appeared to me that he was put in double
1. P. 1.
2. Ibid.
3. 41 STAT. 801 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1536 (1940).
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jeopardy, perhaps not theoretically or technically, but practically. His crime
was in his stubborn conscience.
There are all kinds of conscientious objectors though the law gives exemp-
tion only to one "who by reason of religious training and belief is conscien-
tiously opposed to participation in war in any form." 4 But suppose the refusal
to participate is so genuinely deep-set, as in my case, that the objector will
have nothing to do even with registration or induction. Suppose one's claim
of conscientious objection is upheld, but he then refuses to go to a work camp.
Suppose a man's claim as a conscientious objector is denied by his draft board
and he still refuses to be inducted. He is, then, guilty of a crime and is sent
to jail without having had his defense considered by any judicial tribunal. How
about the Jehovah's *Witnesses who, claiming to be ministers, refuse to ask
for exemption? Those people would, as H. N. Brailsford once remarked, "be
in the forefront of the fight under the Lord God of Hosts at Armageddon,
but will not fight in any other conflict or under any other general." 5 Sup-
pose one refuses to be inducted because he objects to vaccination. Or suppose
he is a vegetarian. It is said that one of the causes of the Hindu Sepoy Rebel-
lion was that the natives refused to bite off parts of bullets which were greased
with pig fat.
Furthermore, conscientious objectors are given exemption only "by reason
of religious training and belief." 6 Does this mean that the objector must
belong to a church that seriously believes "Thou shalt not kill"? In United
States v. Kauten,7 the court held that a professed atheist might be entitled
to exemption. He may be responding, said the court, "to an inward mentor,
call it conscience or God, that is for many persons at the present time the
equivalent of what has always been thought a religious impulse." 8 On the
other hand, General Hershey, Director of Selective Service-and his views
have ordinarily prevailed-insists on belief in a deity or God.
Under the British law any kind of objection is recognized so long as it is
conscientious, and one merely registers as a conscientious objector. The Brit-
ish recognize that they cannot make soldiers of these men. Nor have the Brit-
ish the idea that unless some are punished because of their views, others may
be contaminated. Perhaps more important, the procedure in Britain is not
conducted in Star Chamber fashion.
Julien Cornell has not only stated the case for fair treatment of the con-
scientious objector and shown the confusion of the law, but he has done this
in a compact book that is well written, informative, and provocative. In the
introduction, Harry Emerson Fosdick says: "Whatever the immediate influ-
ence of this book . . . it is bound to be an historical document of continuing
4. 54 STAT. 887 (1940), 50 U. S. C. §305(g) (1940).
5. Pp. 135-36.
6. 54 STAT. 887 (1940), 50 U. S. C. §305(g) (1940).
7. 133 F. (2d) 703 (C. C. A. 2d, 1943).
8. Id. at 708.
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value. The facts here presented are an important part of the story of this war
era and of what war does to the mind of a nation, even when it is fighting for
democracy." 9
ARTHUR GARFIELD HAYS t
How COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKS: A SURVEY OF EXPERIENCE IN LEAD-
ING AMERICAN INDUSTRIES. Harry A. Millis, Research Director. New
York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1942. Pp. xxviii, 986. $4.00.
THIs book collects the facts of American experience in collective bargaining
and provides an analysis which cannot be found in any other single volume.
Its information and analysis is presented through an introductory survey of
New Deal labor policies and through a full account of collective bargaining in
thirteen major industries-daily newspapers, book and job printing, building
construction, bituminous and anthracite coal, railroad, men's clothing, hosiery,
steel, automobile, rubber products, glass, electric products-and three Chicago
service trades, cleaning and dyeing, motion picture operators, and musicians.
An appendix gives a brief historical sketch of collective bargaining in the
United States since 1786 and a summary review of the extent of collective
bargaining in other industries. Each of the main articles is by a separate
author, but they are connected by a uniform scheme of treatment and by a
common assumption that collective bargaining, through freely chosen repre-
sentatives, is the basic institution of industrial democracy. This assumption
is, however, only a starting point for a dispassionate and thorough examina-
tion of how collective bargaining has been employed to deal with the economic
conditions of the industry as they affect its labor relations. In each case, the
developments of collective bargaining have been related to the specific char-
acteristics of the industry, its phases of expansion and contraction, techno-
logical changes, types of enterprises, shifting of production locale, competitive
pressures, wage structures, and the attitudes and policies of government, labor,
and management.
By this approach, the book gives a dynamic description and analysis of the
issues which have confronted management and labor and the way in which
those issues have been met. It pictures accurately and in detail negotiations
over wage and hour levels, adjustment of wage classifications, grievance ma-
chinery, job security, arbitration, strikes and lockouts, and the structure of
labor organizations and employers associations. An effort is made to indicate
how well or badly collective bargaining has served to deal with employment
problems of the industry and to suggest future issues. The industries selected
for this detailed treatment include the old (newspapers) and the new (auto),
9. P. viii.
t Member of the New York Bar.
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mass production (steel) and skilled crafts (glass), industries contracting
(hosiery) and industries expanding (steel), those characterized by industrial
warfare (rubber) and those by cooperation (electric products), those by
restrictive (Chicago service trades) and those by open labor practices (steel).
There are fascinating sidelights. The attempt by Thurman Arnold to prose-
cute the building trades unions for their alleged restrictive practices is presented
as a superficial attack upon a condition produced by the necessity facing those
unions to protect their members from the chaotic and cyclical nature of em-
ployment and earnings in the industry. The book affords an understanding
of the tolls collected by James Petrillo and the power pressure tactics of John
L. Lewis. It should be required reading for Westbrook Pegler.
For judges, lawyers, and law schools, this book has a special importance
arising out of the extraordinary fact that the bulk of the experience which
it describes and analyzes cannot be found in American labor law. The legal
status of the collective bargaining agreement is still a matter of confusion.
Courts have tried to treat the multiple legal relations embodied in a collective
bargaining agreement as (a) of no legal effect whatsoever, (b) a memorandum
of custom and usage entering into the individual employment contract, (c) an
agreement made by the agents of the employees, or (d) a third party bene-
ficiary contract. Rarely has the judiciary come so close to a recognition of
how collective bargaining works, as it did in the case of United States Daily
Pitblishing Corporation v. Nichols,' where the court held that an employer
coming into an organized labor area and hiring union type-setters was obliged
to pay the changing wage rates negotiated under the long established institu-
tions of collective bargaining in that area. The few decisions on railroad
employees have dealt in inconsistent ways with seniority rights and wage
adjustments. Rights and duties of union members and officers within their
associations are a sticky mess of half recognized legal interests. Had the law
kept abreast of actual experience, union membership might reasonably be
considered a regular incident of industrial employment; and liberties of the
individual worker would be protected not by a choice between a union or no
union but, more effectively, by judicial guarantees of secret ballots, regular
elections, and other democratic procedures within the union. It would be
virtually impossible to find any law which recognizes what George Taylor
(author of the article on the hosiery industry and now a public member of
the War Labor Board) calls the common law of industrial relations developed
by collective bargaining. American law is entirely ignorant of the complex
wage structure of American industry, which makes collective bargaining not
simply a matter of periodic negotiations but a daily transaction over individual
classifications and rates. Likewise, it is ignorant of the impact of technological
changes upon wages and working conditions.
This condition arose, I think, from the basic refusal of courts, particularly
in the past, to accept without qualification the principles of collective bargain-
1. 32 F. (2d) 834 (App. D. C. 1929).
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ing through freely chosen representatives. Judges have resisted the applica-
tion of representative democracy to industrial relations; and because they
refused to accept collective bargaining on its own merits, they strained indus-
trial relations through unrelated concepts of individual contracts, the anti-
quated foolishness of master and servant, the vague rules of tort law, and the
terrors of criminal law. American law has been too much concerned with the
warfare between employers and unions, and not enough with the working
relations between them.
It is true that after the sustention of the National Labor Relations Act
labor law developed suddenly and dramatically. Legal structures of the past
had dammed up a vast experience which existed in fact; and once these barriers
were removed by federal legislation, this experience forced upon the courts a
thorough-going revision of judicial attitudes and resulted in the creation of
a new body of law which, in its development, left many lawyers bewildered
and confused. But the law of the National Labor Relations Act is concerned
with the principles upon which collective bargaining is to be instituted and not
with how collective bargaining works after its principles have been accepted.
Even a modern collection of labor law, like the treatise by Teller, is no guide
to the experience contained in the Twentieth Century Fund Study.
The National War Labor Board has, by careful intent, kept its decisions
out of the courts, and the Smith-Connally Act has not changed this policy.
Its legislative history clearly evidences a Congressional intent to remove deci-
sions from judicial review or enforcement, for no body of law exists reflect-
ing the industrial experience in collective bargaining over the past fifty years
which would enable the courts to pass upon the reasonableness of the decisions
of the War Labor Board fixing the terms and conditions of employment in
war industries. The Twentieth Century Fund Study helps to explain why
a wartime labor policy had to be based upon the experience of labor and man-
agement in collective bargaining, and not upon legal rules.2 It shows' that the
complex wage structure of American industry is criss-crossed with inequali-
ties and differentials that have no functional validity. Accordingly, the attempt
by the Government to freeze all wage inequalities for the duration would have
completely paralyzed collective bargaining and had to be modified if the labor
movement were to continue its collaboration with the government in wage
controls. It helps one, also, to understand why the War Labor Board has
drawn its personnel so largely from the ranks of men who took part in the
industrial relations experience of this country and, with notable exceptions,
not from the ranks of lawyers.
Not only is the book invaluable to an understanding of how collective bar-
gaining has worked, but it also shows why collective bargaining must be ex-
2. The Directors of the Twentieth Century Fund interrupted the studies on which
this current volume is based, to publish a special emergency report on the principles of a




panded to deal with economic direction. The history of collective bargaining
contained in this book is studded with evidence showing that the problems of
employers and employees are determined by the basic economic conditions of
the industry and the place of that industry in the national economy. Techno-
logical changes, production methods, and business cycles have determined the
conditions under which labor and management can bargain over wages, hours,
and working conditions. When left uncontrolled, these factors have produced
in each industry declining job opportunities and drastically altered work
skills and still remain a threat to collective bargaining and industrial stability.
If the unions cannot deal with these basic factors, they have no choice of alter-
natives. They are forced to fight technological changes, to defend prevailing
wage rates and to seek to distribute a decreasing amount of job opportuni-
ties. And to survive, employers must engage in protracted struggles with
unions. The war's imperative demand for full production has brought abnut the
realization that when full production is a concrete national policy, and when
the determination of that policy is a public matter in which labor participates,
the unions will cooperate with management in seeking ways to increase pro-
duction and lower costs.
If lawyers are to play any part in this future development, they must learn
the facts in this book. I can think of no better course in labor law than one
based upon legal annotations to the text of How Collectivc Bargaining Wporks.
JOSEPH KOVNER -
JAMIES MOORE WAYNE, SOUTHERN UNIONIST. By Alexander A. Lawrence.
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1943. Pp. xiv, 250.
$3.00.
JAMES MooRE WAYNE, of Georgia, was a member of the Supreme Court of
the United States from 1835 to 1867. Nominated to that position by Andrew
Jackson shortly after Jackson's defeat of the nullification movement, he
served' until the issue of secession had been settled by civil war. He was one
of six justices nominated by Jackson (although one of the nominations was
not ratified until early in the Van Buren administration) and one of the fuur
of these justices who served beyond the beginning of the Lincoln adminis-
tration. The Court on which he served was composed predominantly of Jack-
son appointees and of members chosen by other Presidents with similar senti-
ments. Justice Wayne's official biography is, therefore, largely an account
of the judicial activities of himself and other men who were or might have
been expected to be Jacksonian Democrats. The period was that of the effec-
1 Legal Division, War Production Board.
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tive entrenchment of the corporation as the instrument of thriving business
enterprise. It was a time of conflict over the extent of the power which the
Constitution left to the states for the regulation of interstate commerce. It
saw the development of the doctrine of police power as a justification for the
exercise of powers reserved to the states. And it witnessed the culmination
of the struggle over slavery which brought the cataclysm of civil war.
Because of the importance of these issues, a biography of every member
of the Supreme Court living throughout the period has a degree of importance,
whatever his ability and whatever his particular position as to the issues at
stake. The biography of Justice Wayne has hitherto been neglected, probably
for two principal reasons. First of all, in spite of the length of his service,
he was not an outstanding character, either as to personality or legal ability.
He was an average man, neither more nor less. There was little about him to
stir the enthusiasm of a possible biographer. In the second place, he lost
status and remained permanently discredited in his home community by his
failure to support his state in the secession movement. Georgia regarded his
conduct as so offensive as to justify confiscation of such property as he had
retained within the state. The Southerners of the post-war period who idolized
and idealized the heroes of the Confederacy chose to forget the career of
James Moore Wayne. Mr. Lawrence's study represents the first attempt to
remedy the neglect.
The value of this book is to be found largely in the early chapters, which
give a sketchy account of Wayne's pre-judicial career, and in the later chap-
ters dealing with the Civil War period, rather than in the materials at the
heart of the book dealing with his experience as a member of the Supreme
Court. Although the early materials are too lacking in body to bring the man
into clear perspective, they represent, in large part, gleanings not hitherto
brought together, and historians of the Supreme Court will be grateful to the
author for his patient efforts. For his account of Wayne's wvork on the
Supreme Court, however, the author relies almost exclusively on judicial
decisions which have been worked and re-worked time and again in histories
of the Supreme Court, constitutional histories, judicial biographies, and books
of other sorts. From these chapters of the biography, little can be learned
about Justice Wayne that could not be learned in the more full-bodied treat-
ment of, for example, Charles Warren's The Supreme Court in United States
History. Quite understandably, no doubt, Wayne was one of those justices
whose decisions seemed to reflect zeal to ward off encroachment by the Fed-
eral Government against the peculiar institution of the South. Where slavery
was not involved, however, he aligned himself with Justice McLean in uphold-
ing the exclusive power of the Federal Government to regulate interstate com-
merce-with the consequent prohibition of such action by the state. The book
throws little light on the question whether he had in mind a clear picture of
national destiny or whether he was concerned principally with preventing regu-
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lation of enterprise-regulation which, if it came at all, could be expected at
that time principally from the states and not from the Federal Government.
The story of the war years, drawn from newspapers, memoirs, and other
sources, offers an interesting if somewhat pathetic account of the life of the
elderly justice. Although Mr. Justice Wayne had warm friends, he was viewed
somewhat askance both by the Northerners around him and by the Georgians
who, in indignation manipulated by an old political enemy, were confiscating
his property as a penalty for deserting them in their hour of trial. The author
reaches a cool conclusion that "one finds it hard not to believe that the high
and comfortable station he occupied in Washington, his long residence and
associations there, and the resistance to change which advanced years bring,
were potent influences in his remaining on the Supreme Court." 1
CARL B. SWiSHER t
PERSONAL ESTATES PLANNING IN A CHANGING WVORLD. By Ren6 Wormser.
New York: Simon & Schuster, 1942. Pp. 'xii, 311. $2.50.
WRITTEN as a guide for the layman, this book also has much to recommend
it to the practicing attorney. It offers the general practitioner a survey of the
principles and methods of modern estates planning and suggestions as to what
can be done and what should be avoided.^ For the specialist in estates plan-
ning, the checked lists scattered throughout the book afford a ready reference
to alternative methods of disposition and a valuable reminder of points which
might otherwise be overlooked, at least tenporarily. But it win be in the hands
of the layman that the book will render its greatest service to the legal profes-
sion. A layman who has read this book carefully, and sketched out a tentative
plan which seems to fit his particular needs, will be a far more satisfactory
and appreciative client than one who is amenable to any and all suggestions,
and expects his attorney to be psychic in discovering his needs. Nor should
the profession have any complaint concerning the book's effect upon business.
The author's constant reiteration of the necessity of a competent attorney at
every stage in the formulation of an estate plan should increase, rather than
decrease, the demand for legal advice.
HENRY A. FENN t
1. P. 178.
t Thomas P. Stran Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Department
of Political Science, Johns Hopkins University.
f Assistant Dean, Yale Law School.
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NEW WORLD CONSTITUTIONAL HARMONY: A PAN-AMERICANADIAN PANO-
RAMA. By George Jaffin.
THIs is a reprint of an article from a recent issue of the Columbia Law Re-
view. It appears with a "Foreword" appropriately in four languages, wherein
it is stated to mark the beginning of a long-range policy of the Review to foster
more general understanding of the existence of numerous legal problems of
equally vital interest to both parts of the Western Hemisphere. Whether or
not this laudable policy can be maintained, there is no doubt of the high value
of this essay, perhaps even higher for us than for our southern neighbors.
For it shows how comparable are our constitutional problems and how much
we might learn by intimate contact with countries which have largely accepted
our constitutional ideology while retaining a degree of flexibility in the field
of social and economic amelioration we are only now slowly recapturing.
Direct machinery for the protection of constitutional guaranties, such as the
Mexican amparo, which serves a purpose we must achieve indirectly by pri-
vate party litigation, is another fruitful subject for our study. Incidentally
the author has some good things to say as to the dangers of a one-sided Anglo-
American union which would thrust large segments of the New World into the
seriously opposing, perhaps menacing, Pan-Hispanic union. Let us hope that
the author and the Review can continue with essays equally meaty in a field
where we must know more than we now do if any scheme of rational post-war
adjustment is to be developed.
CHARLES E. CLARK t
t United States Circuit Judge, Second Circuit Court of Appeals.
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